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Massachusetts’ 2006 landmark health reform law has reverberated throughout 
the Boston health care market as providers, insurers, employers and consumers 
adjust and adapt to a post-reform world of nearly universal health insurance cover-
age. Political support for health reform has remained strong and broad-based, but 
reform opponents are more vocal—especially small employers whose premiums 
have increased substantially since the merger of the small group and individual 
health insurance markets. Statewide, uninsurance rates dropped to 2.7 percent in 
2009, down from 8.2 percent in 2006 before passage of the law that included an 
individual mandate for most adults to gain health coverage and new requirements 
for employers. The recession, which started later and was not quite as severe in 
Boston compared to many other metropolitan areas, has had little impact on the 
insurance coverage expansions gained through reform. 
Key developments include:
• With state policy makers deferring hard decisions in the reform law about slow-
ing the growth of health care spending, costs have continued to increase rapidly, 
fueled in part by the ability of Boston’s renowned academic medical centers 
(AMCs) to command higher prices and attract more patients from community 
hospitals.
• State regulators and health plans have been embroiled in disputes over proposed 
rate increases for the small group market, even though the major plans faced 
operating losses as medical costs continued to increase. 
• The fabric of Boston’s traditionally strong health care safety net is changing with 
most community health centers (CHCs) benefiting from coverage expansions 
and safety net hospitals struggling financially as the state shifts uncompensated 
care funding toward insurance subsidies to expand coverage.
Bellwether for National Reform?
Massachusetts was a focal point as the 
national health reform debate unfolded, 
prompting many to view the state 
as a bellwether for implementation 
of national health reform. However, 
Massachusetts and the greater Boston 
area (see map on page 2) were better 
positioned to achieve universal cover-
age than other parts of the country, 
given their low uninsurance rates prior 
to health reform. In addition, Boston—
an affluent community with better 
health and greater health care pro-
vider capacity than other metropolitan 
areas—has not experienced significant 
provider shortages and access issues as 
a result of coverage expansions.
At the same time, Boston’s very 
affluence and the prominent stand-
ing of its renowned academic medical 
centers have made cost containment a 
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Providing Insights that Contribute to Better Health Policy
In March 2010, a team of researchers 
from the Center for Studying Health 
System Change (HSC), as part of the 
Community Tracking Study, visited 
the Boston metropolitan area to study 
how health care is organized, financed 
and delivered in that community. 
Researchers interviewed more than 50 
health care leaders, including repre-
sentatives of major hospital systems, 
physician groups, insurers, employers, 
benefits consultants, community health 
centers, state and local health agencies, 
and others. Researchers also conducted 
several follow-up interviews by phone 
from April through July 2010. The study 
area encompasses Essex, Middlesex, 
Norfolk, Plymouth and Suffolk counties.
2particular challenge. Historically, the 
Boston community has taken pride 
in its health care institutions, espe-
cially the flagship hospitals of Partners 
HealthCare—Massachusetts General 
Hospital and Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital—and Children’s Hospital 
Boston. But with a high concentration 
of AMCs and specialists, the market 
also is characterized by a high propor-
tion of medical care—even relatively 
routine care—provided in expensive 
advanced settings. This pattern has 
been accentuated in recent years as 
the AMCs extended their reach into 
the suburbs with the construction of 
satellite outpatient facilities and grow-
ing affiliations with community-based 
physicians. These developments have 
resulted not only in a greater volume 
of ambulatory care provided at higher 
rates by providers affiliated with or 
owned by the AMCs, but also increased 
referrals to the flagship hospitals for 
inpatient care. 
The large and growing share of med-
ical care provided by the AMCs—for 
outpatient as well as inpatient care—
has been a major factor in costs rapidly 
escalating from a historically high base. 
Stakeholders all agreed that cost trends 
are unsustainable, but many observers 
were not convinced that there is suf-
ficient political will to curb rates for 
high-cost hospital systems, given the 
potential impact on employment. Not 
only is the hospital sector among the 
largest employers in the market, but it 
was also the only one to have grown 
during the recession.
Costs Higher in merged 
insurance market
A key provision of Massachusetts’ 
health reform law was the merger of 
the small group and individual, or 
nongroup, insurance markets, which 
was designed to make premiums more 
affordable for individual purchasers. 
Originally, the state estimated that the 
merged market would reduce nongroup 
premiums by 15 percent and raise 
small group premiums by only 1 per-
cent to 1.5 percent on average. Health 
plan executives indicated the merger 
has caused small group premiums to 
increase more—the result, they say, of 
a weak individual mandate, relaxation 
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of pre-existing condition limitations 
and waiting periods, and allowing some 
of the youngest and healthiest to avoid 
the merged risk pool by purchasing 
less expensive coverage in the separate 
young adult market or remaining on 
their parents’ plans up to age 26. 
Many observers considered the indi-
vidual mandate to be weak because, for 
adults with incomes of at least 300 per-
cent of poverty, or $32,490 for a single 
person in 2010, the penalty for being 
uninsured ($1,068 in 2009) amounts to 
only half the cost of the available low-
est-cost plan. In addition, the penalty is 
assessed on a pro-rated basis ($89 per 
month) for the months a resident lacks 
coverage. According to health plan 
executives and several market observ-
ers, this mild penalty invites individu-
als—known as “jumpers”—to purchase 
insurance only for periods when they 
expect to need care—especially expen-
sive care. Reportedly, some people 
already covered by employer-sponsored 
insurance have been buying short-term 
policies in the merged market to gain 
access to fertility treatments—a man-
dated benefit for fully insured policies, 
but one that self-insured employers that 
are exempt from state mandates tend 
not to provide. 
A state-commissioned report, 
released in June 2010 and comparing 
data between 2006 and 2008, estimated 
that the merger—principally because of 
adverse selection, or attracting sicker 
than average enrollees—increased 
premiums in the small group market 
by 2.6 percent statewide, rather than 
the projected 1 percent to 1.5 percent. 
The effects varied widely across health 
plans—ranging from -4.3 percent to 5.9 
percent—but plan-specific estimates 
were not publicly available.
Health plans have pushed for 
changes, including eliminating continu-
ous open enrollment; assessing the full 
annual penalty for any significant peri-
od of continuous uninsurance, such as 
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60 days; imposing waiting periods for 
certain services; and barring consumers 
from buying in the merged market if 
they have access to employer-sponsored 
coverage. While state policy makers 
have conceded that the individual man-
date needs to be tightened, their pro-
posed solutions have been less stringent 
than those favored by the plans. 
The state Legislature passed Senate 
Bill 2585—widely referred to as the 
“small business health care cost con-
tainment bill”—and Gov. Deval Patrick 
signed the bill into law in August. 
The law limits open enrollment in the 
merged market to twice a year in 2011 
and once a year thereafter—a change 
that should improve the merged mar-
ket risk pool by reducing the ability 
of individuals to jump in and out of 
coverage. However, the new law did 
not change the amount of the penalty 
for being uninsured or the method for 
monthly pro-rating the penalty. As one 
market observer noted, “It’s a tough 
balancing act for the state…clearly, too 
weak a mandate, as we’ve had, means 
that some people inevitably will opt 
out [of coverage] and the pool suffers 
from [adverse] selection, but once you 
impose serious penalties, you’d really 
see public support for reform fall off.”
State forces Rollback of      
Small Group Premiums
The Boston market continues to be 
dominated by three local, nonprofit 
health plans: Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts (with approxi-
mately 50% commercial market share), 
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care (20%) 
and Tufts Health Plan (15%). These 
three major plans consistently earn 
high ratings in national health plan 
rankings and have medical loss ratios in 
the range of 88 percent to 90 percent. 
The rest of the commercial market is 
shared by national for-profit plans and 
smaller local, nonprofit plans, includ-
ing Fallon Community Health Plan and 
Neighborhood Health Plan.
Health plans—citing substantial 
losses in the small group market in 
2009—planned double-digit pre-
mium increases in 2010. However, in 
February, the governor filed emer-
gency regulations authorizing the state 
Division of Insurance (DOI) to disap-
prove any small group rate increases 
exceeding medical inflation by a certain 
margin. In determining whether to 
disapprove rates, DOI used a threshold 
of 7.7 percent, or 150 percent of medi-
cal inflation for the northeast region 
of the country. DOI has long had the 
authority to review rates but had never 
exercised it until 2010. 
The governor’s action to cap premi-
ums was widely viewed as politically 
motivated in a gubernatorial election 
year. One market observer captured 
the views of several respondents when 
he commented, “It allows [the gover-
nor] to paint himself as a champion 
of small businesses…Never mind that 
his own agencies are producing all this 
[evidence] showing…it’s the big-name 
hospitals and those rural [hospitals 
with geographic monopolies] that are 
driving [cost] trends. It plays better 
politically to vilify [insurers].”
As widely expected, the DOI in 
April rejected nearly all small group 
rate increases proposed by the major 
local health plans—a move that forced 
the plans to reinstate rates from April 
2009. The plans, which incurred 
operating losses in 2009—except for 
Harvard Pilgrim—because of the reces-
sion and higher-than-expected medical 
utilization, had expected 2010 to be a 
recovery year. Instead, the local plans 
all recorded sizable operating losses 
for the first quarter of 2010 and had 
to draw on reserves to cover expected 
losses resulting from the rate rollbacks. 
This stood in stark contrast to the 
strong financial performance reported 
by health plans nationally in the first 
quarter of 2010, according to Goldman 
Sachs. 
 Boston Demographics
Boston 
Metropolitan 
Area
Metropolitan Areas 
400,000+ Population
Population, 20091
4,165,815
Population Growth, 5-Year, 2004-092
2.9%  5.5%
Age3
Under 18
22.0% 24.8%
18-64
65.2% 63.3%
65+
12.8% 11.9%
Education3
High School or Higher
89.6% 85.4%
Bachelor's Degree or Higher
42.6%* 31.0%
Race/Ethnicity4
White
76.4% 59.9%
Black
7.1% 13.3%
Latino
8.7% 18.6%
Asian
6.4% 5.7%
Other Race or Multiple Races
1.4% 4.2%
Other3
Limited/No English
9.7% 10.8%
* Indicates a 12-site high.
Sources:
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population 
Estimate, 2009
2 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population 
Estimate, 2004 and 2009
3 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community 
Survey, 2008
4 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community 
Survey, 2008, weighted by U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Population Estimate, 2008
4After DOI rejected the rate 
increases, the plans joined together in 
suing the state and also filed separate 
administrative appeals. In an unex-
pected development, a DOI review 
panel reversed Harvard Pilgrim’s rate 
disapprovals, finding that the increases 
initially sought by the plan were rea-
sonable in light of the rates the plan 
pays providers. Despite prevailing on 
appeal, Harvard Pilgrim subsequently 
reached a surprise settlement with 
the state, as did Blue Cross and Tufts, 
whose appeals had yet to be decided. 
Each plan agreed to rate increases aver-
aging slightly above 8 percent—in most 
cases, well below their initial proposed 
increases—and also promised not 
to seek retroactive rate increases for 
2010 policies that had been renewed at 
2009 rates. The plans contend that the 
agreed-upon rate increases are insuffi-
cient to cover their costs in the merged 
market but said they chose to settle to 
put the contentious standoff behind 
them and encourage the state to turn 
its attention to addressing underlying 
cost drivers. 
The new small business cost con-
tainment law broadens state authority 
over health plans. In the future, plans 
will be required to file all small group 
rate proposals with DOI 90 days before 
they are to take effect. Among other 
provisions, the new law stipulates that 
plans failing to maintain aggregate 
medical loss ratios of 88 percent in 
the merged market will either have 
their rates disapproved by DOI or 
be required to refund excess premi-
ums to policyholders. While the law 
tightens restrictions on plans, it does 
bring more certainty to the rate-filing 
process, by setting timelines for how 
quickly DOI must conduct hearings 
and rule on disapproved rates. This 
may alleviate some of the turmoil and 
uncertainty clouding the merged mar-
ket since early 2010, when the state 
first took action to cap rates.
Hospitals as key Cost Drivers
While the state has focused on cap-
ping premium rates, health plans and 
market observers pointed to high and 
rapidly rising hospital prices as the 
primary factor underlying high pre-
mium increases. This point has been 
reinforced in the past year by a series 
of high-profile reports and hearings, all 
pointing to hospital prices as key cost 
drivers. Most notably, state Attorney 
General Martha Coakley released a 
February 2010 report showing large 
disparities in hospital payment rates 
and emphasizing that those disparities 
were not related to quality gaps. The 
report attributed 75 percent of medi-
cal spending trends to provider price 
increases and 25 percent to increased 
utilization. 
Others in the market, including 
health plans, have broken down spend-
ing trends in greater detail, decom-
posing provider price increases (75% 
of spending trends) into two compo-
nents: increases in unit price (50%) 
and changes in provider mix (25%). 
Changes in provider mix involve shifts 
in care from lower-cost to higher-cost 
settings—that is, from freestanding 
outpatient facilities to hospital out-
patient departments and from com-
munity hospitals to academic medical 
centers, which are reimbursed at the 
highest rates.
According to health plan respon-
dents, AMCs not only receive the 
highest payment levels, but also are 
able to negotiate the largest percent-
age increases, thus increasing spending 
trends and widening the disparities 
between have and have-not provid-
ers in the market. Many market 
observers spoke of different tiers of 
hospital leverage in the Boston mar-
ket, with universal agreement that 
Children’s Hospital and the hospitals 
in the Partners system are “rate set-
ters” occupying the top tier. The 
prestige and brand name associated 
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 economic indicators
Boston 
Metropolitan 
Area
Metropolitan Areas 
400,000+ Population
Individual Income less than 200% of 
Federal Poverty Level1
20.9% 26.3%
Household Income more than $50,0001
64.0% 56.1%
Recipients of Income Assistance and/or 
Food Stamps1
7.4% 7.7%
Persons Without Health Insurance1
4.1%# 14.9%
Unemployment Rate, 20082
4.6% 5.7%
Unemployment Rate, 20093
7.4% 9.2%
Unemployment Rate, March 20104
8.4% 10.4%
# Indicates a 12-site low.
Sources:
1 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community 
Survey, 2008. 200% of Federal Poverty Level 
is $21,660 for an individual in 2010.
2 Bureau of Labor Statistics, average annual 
unemployment rate, 2008
3 Bureau of Labor Statistics, average annual 
unemployment rate, 2009
4 Bureau of Labor Statistics, monthly unem-
ployment rate, March 2010, not seasonally 
adjusted
5 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community 
Survey, 2008
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with Massachusetts General Hospital, 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital and 
Children’s Hospital allow these hos-
pitals to exercise market leverage far 
beyond what their market shares might 
suggest, according to market observers. 
The strong market position of these 
three hospitals is reflected not only 
in consistently robust operating mar-
gins but also, according to the state, 
very large reserves—$951 million for 
Children’s Hospital and $710 million 
for Massachusetts General Hospital.
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical 
Center reportedly has some lever-
age in rate negotiations with heath 
plans, while the remaining hospitals 
in the Boston market were viewed as 
having little or no negotiating power. 
These include Tufts Medical Center 
(a smaller, financially weaker AMC), 
Caritas Christi Health Care (which 
owns six community hospitals in the 
greater Boston area), and two safety net 
hospitals—Boston Medical Center and 
Cambridge Health Alliance. 
Nearly all hospitals in the greater 
Boston area currently have nonprofit 
status, but a notable development 
in March 2010 was the proposed 
sale of Caritas Christi, owned by the 
Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, to 
private equity firm Cerberus Capital 
Management for $830 million. For 
many years, Caritas struggled finan-
cially. A new management team 
turned around the system’s financial 
performance, but the system has been 
seeking a buyer because of a weak bal-
ance sheet. Under the Cerberus deal, 
the Caritas management team will 
stay in place, all employees will be 
retained and Cerberus has pledged to 
maintain Caritas’ charitable mission. 
However, the sale of Caritas remains 
a topic of intense debate, with public 
advocates questioning whether a for-
profit company, especially one with no 
background in hospital operations, will 
maintain Caritas’ mission of serving 
low-income people over the long run. 
The attorney general held hearings on 
the proposed purchase, and the state 
has yet to approve the deal. 
amCs Reach into Suburbs, 
expand market Share
Compared to other metropolitan mar-
kets, Boston has always stood out in 
the importance and status of its AMCs 
and the extent to which many patients 
seek care at these downtown facilities, 
even for services that are not highly 
specialized. Over the past several 
years, all AMCs have extended their 
reach into the suburbs by constructing 
satellite outpatient facilities as well as 
purchasing and affiliating with exist-
ing community providers. Within the 
last three years, for example, Partners 
has opened large outpatient centers 
in Danvers (on the North Shore) and 
Foxborough (on the South Shore) and 
a cancer center operated jointly with 
the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in 
South Weymouth (on the South Shore). 
AMC expansion poses a serious threat 
to community hospitals in the vicinity, 
which are at a competitive disadvan-
tage in physician recruitment, reim-
bursement rates and referrals.  
Health plans noted that suburban 
expansion by AMCs has put pressure 
on costs in two ways: by raising the 
rates paid for services delivered in 
community settings and by increasing 
the number of referrals to downtown 
AMCs, which command the highest 
rates. As noted earlier, plans attrib-
uted about one-quarter of their cost 
trends to a shift in provider mix toward 
higher-cost settings. A state report 
confirmed that an increasing share of 
outpatient expenditures has been con-
centrated in Boston-area AMCs since 
2006. Compared to many other metro-
politan markets, Boston has relatively 
few freestanding ambulatory surgery 
centers and imaging centers to begin 
with. A recent development noted by 
several respondents is that physician-
 Health Status1
Boston 
Metropolitan 
Area
Metropolitan Areas 
400,000+ Population
Chronic Conditions
Asthma
15.2% 13.4%
Diabetes
6.2%# 8.2%
Angina or Coronary Heart Disease
3.5% 4.1%
Other
Overweight or Obese
53.2%# 60.2%
Adult Smoker
13.6% 18.3%
Self-Reported Health Status Fair or 
Poor
10.9%# 14.1%
# Indicates a 12-site low.
Source:
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 
2008 (values do not include Essex County)
6owners of these facilities have been 
approaching hospitals with offers to 
sell the facilities, reportedly because 
recent updates to the Medicare physi-
cian fee schedule and more aggressive 
health plan utilization management 
have made these facilities less profit-
able, particularly for cardiac imaging. 
If freestanding facilities are purchased 
by hospitals, the short-term impact 
will likely be a substantial increase in 
rates paid for services delivered at these 
facilities.
efforts to Curb Provider      
Rates Stalled
Policy makers have proposed curbing 
provider rates—in particular, hospi-
tal rates. Some state legislators had 
proposed pegging rates to a percent-
age of Medicare—110 percent, in one 
proposal—as a temporary measure. 
The governor had proposed giving the 
state the authority to tie provider rate 
increases to medical inflation—as the 
state already has the power to do for 
insurer rates. Many stakeholders had 
opposed the governor’s “one-size-fits-
all” approach, noting its potential for 
exacerbating disparities between hos-
pital haves and have-nots, since some 
hospitals in the latter group may need 
significant rate increases to remain 
financially viable. Some of these stake-
holders supported an approach of 
restricting rate increases only for hos-
pitals with rates above the median.
Respondents expressed skepticism 
that strong measures aimed at curb-
ing hospital costs would be enacted. 
As one market observer commented, 
“The largest employers are all health 
care related…Anything anyone sug-
gests to curb provider costs is labeled 
a ‘job killer’ bill immediately.” Another 
observer noted, “When the Coakley 
report came out in February, many of 
us thought it would be a game chang-
er…but did anything happen with the 
hospitals? No, only the insurers got 
hammered. Then, when the hospital 
surplus report came out [in May], 
some of us said, ‘Maybe this is the 
game changer at last’...but the politi-
cal will to rein in the big hospitals just 
doesn’t seem to be there.”
Indeed, as many observers had 
predicted, the new small business cost 
containment law contains no provi-
sions curbing provider rate increases. 
Instead, it calls for financially strong 
hospitals to make voluntary, one-time 
contributions aimed at easing premium 
increases for small groups. Partners 
volunteered to contribute $40 mil-
lion, an offer that one market observer 
said “is regarded in the community 
as a pitifully small amount compared 
to what people believe [Partners] can 
afford…It has generated a tremen-
dous amount of cynicism in the com-
munity.” Proponents of the voluntary 
fund countered that it is intended only 
to provide short-term relief to small 
businesses until more substantial con-
tracting and payment changes can be 
implemented for the medium and long 
term. With the new law increasing 
requirements for health plans to con-
trol expenses and premium increases, 
some observers expect to see financial-
ly strong providers facing intensifying 
pressure to make significant conces-
sions in rate negotiations with plans.
Hospital respondents all viewed 
cost containment as the major chal-
lenge facing their organizations and 
acknowledged that current cost trends 
are unsustainable. Hospitals pointed to 
union contracts as a barrier to control-
ling their costs, noting that the sector 
is highly unionized and unions have 
strong negotiating leverage. Hospitals 
also argued that inadequate Medicaid 
payment rates continue to make cost 
shifting to private payers a necessity.   
Some observers argued that if 
provider rate caps are introduced in 
the future, they are likely to have an 
unintended impact: causing provid-
ers to reduce or eliminate unprofitable 
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 Health System Characteristics
Boston 
Metropolitan 
Area
Metropolitan Areas 
400,000+ Population
Hospitals1
Staffed Hospital Beds per 1,000        
Population
2.5 2.5
Average Length of Hospital Stay (Days)
5.0 5.3
Health Professional Supply
Physicians per 100,000 Population2
366* 233
Primary Care Physicians per 100,000 
Population2
114* 83
Specialist Physicians per 100,000  
Population2
252* 150
Dentists per 100,000 Population2
84 62
Average monthly per-capita reimburse-
ment for beneficiaries enrolled in fee-
for-service Medicare3
$701 $713
* Indicates a 12-site high.
Sources
1 American Hospital Association, 2008
2 Area Resource File, 2008 (includes nonfed-
eral, patient care physicians)
3 HSC analysis of 2008 county per capita 
Medicare fee-for-service expenditures, 
Part A and Part B aged and disabled, 
weighted by enrollment and demographic 
and risk factors. See www.cms.gov/
MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/05_FFS_Data.
asp.
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services, such as mental health. Other 
respondents suggested that rate caps 
would simply lead providers to induce 
utilization to make up for lost revenues, 
and that meaningful trend moderation 
can only come through broader-based 
and longer-term payment reform.     
Global Payment as long-term 
Reform Strategy
Global payment for providers gained 
traction as a long-term strategy for 
moderating health cost trends in mid-
2009, when the Massachusetts Special 
Commission on the Health Care 
Payment System recommended that 
the state adopt global payments as the 
predominant form of provider payment 
within a five-year timeframe. Instead 
of fee-for-service reimbursements, 
providers would receive prospective 
payments for all or most of the covered 
care they provide to patients, along 
with additional financial rewards for 
“the provision of accessible and high 
quality care,” according to the state. In 
contrast to episode-based payments, 
which bundle services for clinically 
defined episodes of care for specific 
conditions or procedures, global pay-
ments bundle a broad range of services 
at the patient level over a defined 
period.
Most observers expected that the 
state would implement global payment 
by prescribing the payment method 
for private insurance and Medicaid 
and seek to apply the same method to 
Medicare through a waiver. In addition, 
many expected that the state would 
not just specify a uniform payment 
method, but also determine actual 
payment rates through all-payer rate 
setting. However, some respondents 
expressed skepticism that sweeping 
payment changes would be possible, 
given that stakeholders who stood to 
lose under global payment would be 
formidable opponents. As one market 
observer noted, “Those doing extreme-
ly well under fee for service want to 
keep change at bay as long as possible, 
and you shouldn’t underestimate their 
political influence.” 
One notable payment reform 
development already taking place in 
the Boston market is the Alternative 
Quality Contract (AQC) rolled out by 
Blue Cross at the beginning of 2009. 
The AQC is a five-year contract, with 
each provider’s initial global payment 
level set based on historic payment 
levels to that provider. The payment 
amount is adjusted annually for infla-
tion, and in an effort to avoid one of 
the pitfalls of capitation—avoidance 
of sick patients—the payment is also 
risk adjusted annually for health risk 
changes in the population attributed to 
the provider. The global payment level 
is not reset for actual costs annually, so 
providers can retain or share margins 
from any efficiencies they achieve and 
maintain. In an attempt to ensure that 
provider efficiencies don’t involve stint-
ing on needed patient care—another 
pitfall of traditional capitation—AQC 
includes performance incentives based 
on process, outcomes and patient expe-
rience measures for both inpatient and 
ambulatory care. 
The first providers Blue Cross 
targeted and signed up for the AQC 
included Atrius Health, the largest 
independent medical group in the 
market, and Mount Auburn Cambridge 
Independent Practice Association, 
the physician organization affiliated 
with Mount Auburn Hospital and 
Cambridge Health Alliance. Both 
organizations are integrated provid-
ers with a history of accepting capi-
tated payment for health maintenance 
organization (HMO) patients. Other 
providers that have since signed up 
for the AQC span a wide range of size 
and structure; the larger providers 
include Caritas Christi, Tufts Medical 
Center, and South Shore Hospital and 
its physician hospital organization, or 
Some respondents 
expressed skepticism 
that sweeping pay-
ment changes would 
be possible, given that 
stakeholders who stood 
to lose under global 
payment would be 
formidable opponents.
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PHO. Currently, AQC contracts cover 
approximately 32 percent of Blue Cross’ 
HMO enrollees, or about 16 percent of 
all its enrollees. 
Blue Cross was exploring whether 
to expand the AQC model to preferred 
provider organization (PPO) contracts. 
However, executives said they were 
fully aware that, even with a successful 
expansion of the model to PPO con-
tracts, the impact of global payment on 
realignment of provider incentives will 
be limited, unless government and other 
commercial payers embrace the global 
payment model as well.
Physicians align with Hospitals, 
Join larger Practices
While direct employment of physicians 
by hospitals remains relatively rare in 
the Boston market, physician align-
ment with hospitals through physician 
organizations (POs) is high and grow-
ing, according to many respondents. 
Physicians belonging to medical school 
faculty typically are employed by their 
universities and belong to POs that con-
tract with AMCs on an exclusive basis. 
Community physicians also affiliate 
with hospitals through POs, and respon-
dents noted that Partners, Beth Israel 
Deaconess and Tufts have all added 
community physicians to their POs in 
the past few years. 
For physicians, a key advantage of 
aligning with hospitals is the ability to 
obtain substantially higher rates from 
health plans compared to what small 
practices would be able to negotiate on 
their own. Respondents noted that this 
was particularly true for physicians affil-
iated with Partners and Children’s. 
For community physicians, another 
advantage of affiliating with hospitals 
is the technical support, and in some 
cases, the financial subsidies that sys-
tems can provide for electronic medi-
cal record (EMR) implementation and 
use—a particular challenge for smaller 
practices. The degree of financial sup-
port for ambulatory EMRs varies widely, 
with Caritas Christi offering subsidies 
as an inducement for physicians to align 
with its system, while Partners requires 
affiliated physicians to adopt its EMR 
but provides no subsidy. Hospital sys-
tems in the Boston market have focused 
on using information technology as a 
strategy to bind affiliated physicians 
more tightly to their organizations.
Atrius Health, which consists of 
Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates 
and four smaller suburban multispecial-
ty practices, continues to be the Boston 
area’s premier independent medical 
group—one that is able to command 
high rates from health plans. Recently, 
Atrius shifted a substantial share of 
referrals that previously had gone to 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital over to 
Beth Israel—apparently the result of a 
combination of factors, including tense 
relations between Atrius and Brigham 
specialists (primarily over loss of Atrius 
patients after inpatient stays), better 
information technology integration 
between Atrius and Beth Israel, and cost 
concerns resulting from rate differen-
tials between Brigham and Beth Israel 
(Atrius bears risk for the cost of hospital 
care for many of its HMO patients). 
With increasing incentives to align 
with hospital systems or join large 
groups, physicians remaining in small 
practices face an increasingly difficult 
situation. With no leverage over health 
plans, these physicians reportedly are 
deeply dissatisfied with low reimburse-
ment rates and talk about dropping out 
of health plan networks, especially Blue 
Cross. However, opting out of networks 
does not appear to be a viable strategy 
in a market where HMOs still account 
for more than half of health plan enroll-
ment and where so many top physicians 
participate in networks through the 
large organizations they are affiliated 
with. Small practices risk losing a large 
share of their patient panels if they drop 
out of health plan networks.  
For physicians, a key 
advantage of align-
ing with hospitals is 
the ability to obtain 
substantially higher 
rates from health 
plans compared to 
what small practices 
would be able to 
negotiate on their 
own. 
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tiered Networks Develop in 
Response to Cost Pressures
There is little differentiation across 
the major local plans—Blue Cross, 
Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts—in provider 
networks, product design or prices, 
according to most respondents. The 
commercial market is split about equally 
between PPOs and HMOs, but HMOs 
in this market have broad networks 
almost identical to PPOs—including all 
hospitals and the vast majority of physi-
cians in the state. Most employers and 
consumers have continued to demand 
broad provider networks, but the will-
ingness to trade provider choice for cost 
savings may be slowly growing in the 
Boston market.
The state’s largest purchaser, the 
Group Insurance Commission (GIC), 
which purchases health benefits on 
behalf of all state and some munici-
pal employees, has been a pioneer in 
demanding tiered-provider networks 
from health plans. While the exact net-
work design varies by plan and prod-
uct, all GIC products have a three-tier 
copayment structure at the individual 
specialist physician level (for desig-
nated specialties only), and most GIC 
products feature a two-tier or three-tier 
hospital copayment structure. Most 
GIC products do not separate primary 
care physicians into tiers. Participating 
plans all use the same pooled dataset to 
develop their provider tiers, but because 
each plan applies its own methodol-
ogy, provider designations vary by plan 
and product—which has undermined 
credibility with physicians. GIC tiered 
networks have resulted in physician 
pushback, culminating in a lawsuit filed 
in 2008 by the Massachusetts Medical 
Society against the GIC and two plans 
(Tufts and UniCare). The suit argued 
that faulty data and methods were being 
used in rating physicians; the case has 
yet to be resolved.  
Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts have made 
their GIC tiered products available to 
other employers but with little success. 
Among the key reasons are reportedly 
the lack of a steep premium discount 
or strongly differentiated copayment 
tiers, and the fact that the GIC benefit 
year begins in July while many private 
employers’ benefit years start in January. 
As a result, the plan would have to 
re-tier providers halfway through the 
benefit year for private employers—
a prospect that most employers find 
unappealing and that may run afoul of 
state consumer disclosure rules.
In 2010, the GIC began requiring its 
two largest plans—Harvard Pilgrim and 
Tufts—to offer narrow-network prod-
ucts. These products—with premiums 
about 20 percent lower than tiered full-
network products—all exclude Partners 
teaching hospitals and the Lahey Clinic 
in Burlington; the Tufts offering also 
excludes Beth Israel. Within the narrow-
network structure, these new products 
retain the same tiered-network structure 
as other GIC products. Because narrow-
network products have just been rolled 
out for July enrollment, it is not yet clear 
how much take up there will be from 
GIC enrollees.
Blue Cross, which does not partici-
pate with the GIC, offers tiered-network 
products substantially different from 
those offered to the GIC. Its products, 
called Blue Options, do not tier special-
ists at all; instead, they tier primary 
care physician groups and hospitals. A 
revamped design rolled out in January 
2010 introduced very large cost-sharing 
differentials across the three Blue 
Options hospital tiers. In one popular 
PPO version, Tier 1 has a $150 inpatient 
copayment with no deductible; Tier 2 
has a $150 copayment/$500 deduct-
ible; and Tier 3 has a $1,000 copay-
ment/$2,000 deductible. It is reportedly 
the high cost sharing for Tier 3 hospi-
tals, including Brigham, Mass General 
and Children’s, that employers find most 
attractive about Blue Options. These 
products appear to have gained signifi-
Most employers and 
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cant traction with small and mid-sized 
employers that want alternatives to 
high-deductible health plans.
The new small business cost contain-
ment law requires health plans in the 
merged market to offer, beginning in 
2011, at least one narrow-network or 
tiered-network product, at a premium at 
least 12 percent below that of a full-net-
work product with equivalent benefits. 
Once these new products are developed 
for the merged market, plans are likely 
to make them available to larger groups 
as well, but the extent to which these 
products will gain traction remains 
uncertain in a market accustomed to 
broad provider access. 
Consumer-Driven Health      
Plans Grow
Consumer-driven health plans 
(CDHPs)—high-deductible insurance 
products typically paired with spending 
accounts—have grown in the Boston 
market over the past few years, largely 
because of the recession and ongo-
ing but intensifying cost pressures on 
employers. Blue Cross estimated that 
CDHPs now account for about 15 per-
cent of its total commercial enrollment 
and approximately half of its small 
group enrollment. 
It has become increasingly common 
for large employers to offer a CDHP 
as an option alongside a traditional 
HMO and/or PPO, according to ben-
efit consultants. Some large employers 
have moved to a fixed-dollar premium 
contribution as a way to incentivize 
take up of CDHPs, but very few large 
employers have gone to full replace-
ment. Many employers still stop short of 
implementing CDHPs with deductibles 
high enough ($1,200/individual, $2,400/
family) to be eligible for health savings 
accounts (HSAs). Instead, some large 
employers “are easing into the high-
deductible market” by offering products 
with individual deductibles around 
$1,000 and pairing those products with 
health reimbursement arrangements 
(HRAs) where the employer might con-
tribute half of the deductible amount. 
While HSAs have grown in the past few 
years, HRAs are still favored by many 
employers for the greater degree of con-
trol retained by employers. 
Some small employers have moved 
aggressively to full replacement with 
CDHPs—in some cases moving to prod-
ucts with deductibles far larger than the 
HSA statutory minimums. Depending 
on their financial circumstances and the 
labor markets in which they compete, 
some small employers (such as profes-
sional services companies competing for 
high-wage workers) make substantial 
contributions to HRAs or HSAs, while 
other small employers do not contribute 
to these accounts and have been paring 
the share of premiums that they pay. 
Some small employers struggling to 
survive the recession dropped insurance 
coverage altogether.
effects of Reform Vary Greatly 
by employer Size
Large employers have felt almost no 
direct impact from state health care 
reform, except for the “hassle factor” of 
complying with reporting requirements, 
according to most respondents. The 
smaller the employer, the more burden-
some it has been to comply with report-
ing and other requirements—which 
apply to all employers with 11 or more 
full-time equivalent workers—because 
smaller employers typically lack the 
personnel and expertise to guide them 
through the requirements. Respondents 
observed that changing state require-
ments, including a shift from annual 
to quarterly filing for some employers, 
have made compliance more challeng-
ing for employers and “multiplied the 
nuisance value.”
Employers small enough—with 50 or 
fewer employees—to be in the merged 
small group and nongroup markets 
have felt the impact of rising premiums 
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most acutely, in large part because they 
are now subsidizing individuals in that 
market. Their vocal complaints about 
double-digit premium increases played 
a key role in the governor’s election-year 
move to cap premiums, according to 
many respondents.
The high cost of premiums in the 
merged market has created a resurgence 
of interest in association health plans, 
which were banned by the state in 
1996. Several small business coalitions, 
including the Retailers Association of 
Massachusetts, pushed for the return 
of these plans—now being called group 
purchasing cooperatives. Consumer 
advocates pushed back, arguing that 
the only way for these plans to achieve 
lower costs is to cherry-pick younger, 
healthier people from the merged mar-
ket, which would destabilize and raise 
costs for the remaining merged market. 
The new small business law allows for 
the creation of group purchasing coop-
eratives but contains safeguards against 
adverse impact on the merged market. 
These safeguards include broad DOI 
oversight, limits on the aggregate size of 
cooperatives, and prohibitions against 
denial of coverage based on health sta-
tus, age, race or sex.   
When the Health Connector, the 
state’s insurance exchange, was estab-
lished as part of health reform, some 
observers predicted that the role of bro-
kers would be much diminished, if not 
eliminated, since small groups would 
be able to purchase coverage directly 
through the Connector. However, small 
employers have continued to purchase 
coverage almost entirely through bro-
kers, and the Commonwealth Choice 
Contributory Plan, aimed at employers 
with 50 or fewer employees, has enrolled 
few people. Respondents observed that 
the model was premised on the notion 
that small employers would value offer-
ing a choice of products from different 
health plans, when what employers 
value most are convenience and admin-
istrative ease, which they receive from 
brokers. Clearly, price is also a top 
priority for small employers, but pur-
chasing within the Connector confers 
no price advantage. The Connector is 
replacing the Contributory Plan with 
a revamped small business program, 
Business Express, but the three largest 
plans in the market have not yet agreed 
to participate.
Plans Renew emphasis on 
Utilization management
Controlling utilization continues to 
be a challenge for health plans, which 
estimated that increased utilization 
accounts for up to a quarter of their cost 
trends. The response from plans over 
the past few years has been to impose 
tighter utilization management, with 
Blue Cross reportedly being the most 
aggressive in implementing these pro-
grams. Plans reported a wide variety of 
services now receiving more scrutiny 
and sometimes requiring prior authori-
zation, including hysterectomies, spine 
surgeries, neuropsychological tests, 
chiropractic services, sleep clinics and 
bariatric surgery.
The major plans have had imaging 
management programs in place for 
several years, aimed at controlling use 
of high-cost services, such as magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI),  computed 
tomography (CT), positron emission 
tomography (PET) and nuclear cardiac 
imaging tests. These programs have 
been fairly effective at curbing imag-
ing volume, which has remained flat 
or increased at a modest 1 percent 
to 2 percent a year, according to one 
plan executive. However, overall imag-
ing costs continue to soar because of 
increases in provider prices, shifts in 
provider mix and changes in technol-
ogy. One plan estimated that the unit 
prices it pays hospitals for imaging have 
grown at an annual pace of 8 percent to 
10 percent—in contrast to prices paid 
to freestanding imaging centers, which 
have increased at only 3 percent a year, 
When the Health 
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from a much lower base. Over the past 
few years, the market has seen a pro-
nounced shift in the setting for imaging 
services—away from freestanding facili-
ties, toward hospitals—and this devel-
opment has exacerbated cost trends 
for plans. Adoption of new imaging 
technology, such as the shift from tradi-
tional to digital mammography, also has 
been costly for plans, which reimburse 
providers 35 percent to 45 percent more 
for digital mammograms.
The major plans all reported impos-
ing tighter controls on prescription drug 
utilization over the past few years, with 
Blue Cross reportedly the most aggres-
sive in implementing step therapies and 
taking drugs, such as antihistamines, 
off formulary. For high-cost specialty 
drugs, Blue Cross has been aggres-
sively moving some drugs—particularly 
oncology drugs—from a medical benefit 
to pharmacy benefit, in part to avoid 
high markups charged by providers for 
such drugs and to allow its specialty 
pharmacy benefits manager to oversee 
utilization and dosage. Blue Cross also 
has taken steps to move patients from 
infused and injectable drugs that have to 
be delivered in clinical settings to self-
injectable drugs that can be adminis-
tered at home. Other plans have not yet 
adopted similar measures for specialty 
drugs, but one market observer sug-
gested that “after Blue Cross has taken 
the heat from the providers, we might 
see the others following suit…There’s 
no question—the number of these high-
tech drugs…and the costs have bal-
looned over the last several years.” 
Provider Capacity largely 
adequate to meet Coverage 
expansions
When state health reform was enacted 
in 2006, there was concern about 
whether hospital capacity overall, and 
emergency department (ED) capac-
ity in particular, would be sufficient to 
meet the demand for services of newly 
insured people. While the uninsur-
ance rate has fallen to approximately 
2.7 percent, with more than 400,000 
people gaining coverage statewide, most 
mainstream providers in the greater 
Boston area reported that increased 
demand has been modest to moderate 
and has not overwhelmed their capacity. 
Although the state banned ED diver-
sions, EDs appear to be coping with 
increased demand fairly well. Hospital 
respondents noted that patients who 
in the past would have been uninsured 
are now showing up as insured patients. 
But, they also observed that reimburse-
ment under MassHealth, the state 
Medicaid program, and Commonwealth 
Care, the new subsidized insurance 
program, which pays rates similar to 
MassHealth, has been roughly the same 
as earlier subsidies from the state’s 
uncompensated care pool, which was 
restructured and reduced with the 
implementation of state health reform.
Approximately two out of three 
newly insured people are covered by 
MassHealth or Commonwealth Care, 
and most of them have continued to use 
the same safety net providers they had 
used when uninsured, though perhaps 
at a higher utilization rate. As a safety 
net provider explained, “The system is 
already designed for them so that there 
are a lot of social needs met by safety 
net providers, whether it’s linguistic, 
access, transportation…The safety net 
provides that, and they go to the places 
that are most easily accessible.” As a 
result, Boston’s robust safety net con-
tinues to play a central role in deliver-
ing care for low-income people. These 
providers have a smaller proportion 
of uninsured patients now, but more 
patients overall, particularly for out-
patient services. Despite ongoing con-
cerns about a shortage of primary care 
physicians, access to both primary and 
specialty care continues to be relatively 
strong. Dental and pharmacy capac-
ity has increased with federal grants, 
but mental health capacity has become 
increasingly sparse.  
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A stable set of providers makes up 
the Boston community’s strong safety 
net. The main safety net hospitals 
continue to be Boston Medical Center 
(BMC) and Cambridge Health Alliance 
(CHA). BMC has twice the inpatient 
capacity of CHA and is a Level I trauma 
center and tertiary care provider, while 
CHA, the only public hospital remain-
ing in Massachusetts, focuses half of 
its inpatient services on mental health. 
BMC operates the busiest emergency 
department in the greater Boston area, 
followed by CHA. BMC primarily con-
tracts with community health centers 
(CHCs) for outpatient primary care, 
while CHA operates its own primary 
care clinics for low-income people. 
Low-income people in the Boston 
area continue to be well served by 31 
CHCs—26 of them within the city of 
Boston. Most of these clinics are feder-
ally qualified health centers (FQHCs), 
which receive federal funding and 
enhanced payment rates for MassHealth 
and Commonwealth Care patients. 
Several clinics are FQHC look-alikes, 
eligible for enhanced rates but not feder-
al grant funding. Historically, the CHC 
movement began in Boston, and CHCs 
have received strong federal funding. In 
the last few years, CHCs have been able 
to expand their physical and operational 
capacity with the help of federal stimu-
lus dollars and state funding aimed at 
reducing non-urgent ED use.
Coverage expansions Survive, 
but financial Strains emerge
The high level of coverage achieved 
under state health reform has been 
largely sustained through the recent 
recession. Despite state budget pressures 
and threatened cuts by the Legislature, 
MassHealth eligibility and benefits have 
been largely protected both because 
the state placed a high priority on 
universal coverage and because the 
federal government required states to 
maintain Medicaid eligibility levels to 
receive stimulus funding. State bud-
get problems, combined with a lack 
of federal matching funds, did lead 
Commonwealth Care to transition legal 
immigrants from full eligibility to a 
more limited insurance product.
While MassHealth coverage has 
been protected, budget strains have led 
the state to pull back on provider rate 
increases promised under health reform. 
The reform law included rate increases 
to physicians and hospitals totaling 
$270 million over three years, from fis-
cal years 2007 through 2009. It was this 
provision that enabled state reform to 
gain support from many stakeholders, 
including health plans and mainstream 
providers. However, because of the 
recession and budget concerns, in 2009, 
MassHealth reduced some of the previ-
ous provider rate increases and adopted 
a new “efficiency standard,” changing 
its hospital reimbursement methodol-
ogy to pay all acute care hospitals 75 
percent—down from 90 percent—of the 
2005 state average cost per discharge. 
Additional cuts in hospital reimburse-
ment took place in 2010. Along with 
the direct impact of MassHealth rates 
on providers, there is concern that 
inadequate Medicaid reimbursement 
increases cost shifting to private insur-
ers, resulting in higher premiums. 
The financial impact of reform and 
the recession has varied across safety net 
providers, with most CHCs faring bet-
ter than the two safety net hospitals. In 
2009, both BMC and CHA had operat-
ing losses (-2.5% and -8%, respectively), 
representing significant deterioration in 
financial performance from prior years. 
Both hospitals’ financial problems have 
resulted from declines in long-standing 
supplemental disproportionate share 
hospital (DSH) payments under reform. 
Also, the change in MassHealth pay-
ment methodology resulted in reim-
bursement rates for BMC and CHA 
being reduced by approximately one-
quarter. BMC, along with several com-
munity hospitals, is suing the state for 
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declining Medicaid support. In contrast, 
CHA did not participate in the litiga-
tion, instead working to reduce its costs 
by consolidating facilities and streamlin-
ing care delivery and working with the 
state to gain more funding. According 
to recent media reports, CHA is actively 
seeking to affiliate with or be acquired 
by a larger Boston-based hospital sys-
tem, and to that end, has engaged in 
discussions with both Partners and 
Caritas. 
Another financial challenge for 
safety net hospitals comes from state 
changes in reimbursement to hospitals 
from the uncompensated care pool, 
now called the Health Safety Net Trust 
Fund (HSN), for treating the remain-
ing uninsured. More than one-third of 
the funding has been shifted to help 
pay for insuring more people, particu-
larly through Commonwealth Care. 
Previously, most of the uncompensated 
care funds had gone to hospitals, and it 
was hospitals that essentially bore the 
entire funding cut—their payments have 
declined approximately 40 percent. In 
2006, BMC and CHA were reimbursed 
at approximately 125 percent of costs, 
while the HSN now pays BMC 103 per-
cent of costs and CHA 79 percent (with 
BMC reportedly receiving a higher rate 
because of its tertiary services). 
In contrast to the safety net hospi-
tals, most CHCs have benefited under 
reform, with slightly higher and faster 
reimbursement through MassHealth 
and Commonwealth Care than the 
uncompensated care pool. For the 
remaining uninsured, fee-for-service, 
claims-based reimbursement from 
the HSN has replaced lump-sum pay-
ments. In fact, overall HSN payments 
to CHCs grew 13 percent from 2008 
to 2009, which the state attributed to 
higher reimbursement rates for medi-
cal and dental visits, as well as more 
prescription drug claims resulting from 
increased CHC pharmacy capacity. 
While CHCs as a whole have fared 
relatively well under reform, the five 
CHCs operating under BMC’s hospi-
tal license have been under increasing 
financial strain. These CHCs used to 
receive enhanced payments from the 
uncompensated care pool, but under 
the HSN, payments are the same across 
CHCs. Also, given the smaller cushion 
that BMC itself receives from the HSN, 
these five clinics are in jeopardy of los-
ing the uncompensated care funding 
that BMC passed through to them in 
the past. 
Safety net providers now bear more 
responsibility for getting their patients 
insured and keeping them insured. The 
state has decentralized the process for 
enrolling and renewing coverage in 
public insurance and other programs, 
with safety net providers reporting they 
are not adequately compensated for this 
additional administrative expense. Also, 
CHCs and hospitals are unable to obtain 
HSN reimbursement for treating unin-
sured patients that are eligible for public 
coverage but not enrolled. 
Medicaid managed care plans 
also have felt increasing financial 
strains from state budget pressures. 
Approximately half of the MassHealth 
population is in managed care, with 
enrollment split primarily among 
three plans—BMC’s HealthNet, CHA’s 
Network Health and  Neighborhood 
Health Plan—with a fourth plan, Fallon, 
also having a small presence in the 
market. In 2009, three of the four plans 
reported losses, which they largely 
attributed to a lack of MassHealth pay-
ment increases over the past three years. 
The plans, in turn, reportedly have 
required some providers to accept lower 
reimbursement for MassHealth man-
aged care enrollees.
On the whole, the Boston safety net 
has been somewhat insulated from the 
recession. Despite rising unemploy-
ment, state data show no overall reduc-
tion in insurance coverage in either the 
general or working-age populations 
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from 2008 to 2009. In addition to some 
unemployed workers becoming eligible 
for public programs, the state’s Medical 
Security Program (MSP) helped to main-
tain coverage for unemployed workers 
with incomes up to 400 percent of pov-
erty. Largely financed by an employer 
tax, the MSP subsidizes COBRA con-
tinuation coverage or, for those without 
COBRA access, pays the entire premium 
for enrollment in a Blue Cross product 
in the merged market. However, increas-
ing enrollment and rising costs present 
financial challenges to maintaining the 
program. 
issues to track
•  To what extent will new restrictions 
on open enrollment in the merged 
small group market succeed in 
improving the risk pool and moderat-
ing premium increases?
• What measures, if any, will the state 
take to curb hospital price increases? 
Will the state proceed to implement 
all-payer global payment as recom-
mended by the Payment Reform 
Commission? If so, will it evolve to an 
all-payer rate setting program?
• Will the trend of increasing market 
share for academic medical centers 
continue? What will be the impact on 
utilization and costs?
• To what extent will limited-network 
products gain traction in the market?
• What impact will state budget pres-
sures have on MassHealth and 
Commonwealth Care covered services 
and provider reimbursement rates? 
What impact, in turn, will that have 
on access for low-income populations, 
the financial health of safety net pro-
viders and cost shifting to private pay-
ers?
• In what ways will state health reform 
be reshaped by national health reform 
requirements?
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